Today, the shimmering glass cupola and crisply modern corridors of the renovated German Reichstag attract the admiration of Germans and international visitors alike. The profusion of glass in the building, from the cupola down to the central Bundestag chamber, has been read as a sign of transparency, or honesty, in the workings of the German government. Yet in a capital where frenetic new construction is the rule rather than the exception, many marvel at the cost of such initiatives without considering that it is often illegal workers whose labor has allowed the Reichstag, along with so much of Berlin, to rise again.
Aside from claims that illegality cannot be tolerated, the presence of illegal persons, either as workers or residents, is barely acknowledged.
The Nature of the Problem
The gap between rhetoric and reality is wider on the issue of illegal immigration than it is on almost any other in Germany today. Through policies passed into law in this same Reichstag, the country has taken an official zero-tolerance policy toward illegal immigration, emphasizing the need to deport current illegal residents and illegal workers as well as criminalizing aid to such illegal persons, estimated unofficially at upwards of one million. Nonetheless, enforcement against illegal entry and residence is generally weak, and authorities often look the other way as illegal workers continue to make crucial contributions to Germany’s overall economy, especially in informal or low-profit margin sectors such as domestic care and agriculture. Although enforcement against illegal labor has increased among the sorts of large-scale construction firms that completed the Reichstag, illegal immigration continues to occupy something of a “non-presence” in public debate, according to Veysel Özcan, a researcher on migration at the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin. Aside from claims that illegality cannot be tolerated, the presence of illegal persons, either as workers or residents, is barely acknowledged.
In the end, it is the illegal persons themselves who are caught in this perilous gap. Many employers can still easily defy the law by relying heavily, if not exclusively, on illegal workers, thereby keeping the demand for this type of labor high. Nevertheless, the constant risk of being detected—however small—means that illegal workers and residents, in practice, have no access to the legal protections guaranteed them under either German law or the European Charter of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: no rights to schooling, emergency health care, or minimum safety standards in the workplace. For a person who crosses the border into Germany from, say, the Czech Republic, as a temporary illegal worker, the possibility of returning home may not make this scenario a troubling one, but for an immigrant from Lebanon or Ecuador, it is a very different matter indeed.
Although the 2001 report of the Süssmuth Commission, an independent body charged with suggesting immigration reforms, made a move toward closing this gap between rhetoric and reality by advocating liberalization in a variety of policy areas, neither it nor the more conservative new Immigration Law, or Zuwanderungsgesetz, passed in July 2004, fully takes stock of how to balance two goals: (1) incorporating the wide range of immigrants who aim to contribute beneficially to Germany as workers and residents, and (2) stiffening enforcement measures against persons who intend to engage in crime or corruption rather than productive contributions. This failure can be attributed to relatively obvious factors, including Germany’s fairly new understanding of itself as a country of immigration and renewed fears of foreign terrorists, as well as less apparent factors, including the satisfaction of some Germans with the unfavorable position of illegal workers and residents in the status quo. To consider these factors while seeking to strike a balance between the goals of incorporation and enforcement would be a step in the right direction.
In the end, it is the illegal persons themselves who are caught in this perilous gap.
Illegal Migrants: Characteristics and Motivations
In Germany, as in most countries with substantial immigration, illegal immigrants fall into four general categories: (1) “over-stayers” who have entered legally on temporary visas and have not sought, or were not granted, a legal extension of stay; (2) persons, including many seasonal workers and commuters, who have permission to be in the country but are breaching their conditions of stay by working illegally; (3) asylum seekers whose applications and appeals for reconsideration have been rejected; and, finally, (4) persons who have not been granted permission to enter and have, therefore, entered clandestinely by evading inspection or using means of deception, such as false papers. It is estimated that approximately 80 percent of illegal immigrants in the European Union enter by means of tourist visas.
Among those who are now illegal in Germany, few have come with the intention of having, or keeping, this status.
So why do immigrants come? For the last few decades, studies of immigration have spoken of the relationship between the factors that “push” migrants from their home countries and the factors that “pull” them to a particular receiving country. While it is obvious that people migrate for different reasons, it is plausible that people will search, in the countries to which they immigrate, for certain “pull” characteristics that are the converse of those that “push” them from their homes. However, the tendency of this model to consider negative pushes and positive pulls in terms of general circumstances—economic prosperity, political stability—is undermined by strong evidence that migrants’ decisions within large-scale migration flows are often more individual. It has become clearer that family, friends, or community ties, as well as cultural affinity and languages spoken, can be just as important as prospects for finding work or anticipated access to public services. The British migration expert Philip Anderson, who has done extensive research on illegal immigration in Munich, Germany, notes the important role played by “bridgeheads”: persons who are often well-connected in the immigrant communities of receiving countries and help to coordinate the immigration plans of prospective migrants.
Nevertheless, Anderson points out that among those who are now illegal in Germany, few have come with the intention of having, or keeping, this status: “The vast majority of undocumented immigrants don’t envision this as a way of life. They want out, not because they are seeking after social benefits, usually, but because they are ambitious and pioneering. They want to contribute.”
“Undocumented migrants are just the opposite of what the term ‘illegal alien’ tries to imply – i.e. they are the most law abiding residents”
Admitting Advantages, Decrying Disadvantages
In undertaking this analysis, it would be a mistake to assume that what is “illegal” is bad and thereby handcuff ourselves to a position of unqualified condemnation. At some point, reality compels us to examine the situation in terms of its practical consequences – for the migrants themselves, for the citizens of the destination country, and for the state apparatus ostensibly charged with upholding the rule of law. Legal regulations and restrictions exist for a variety of objectives, and pragmatism – as has already been suggested – is often given more weight than moral considerations. Ironically, observes researcher Holk Stobbe, formerly with the Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, “Undocumented migrants are just the opposite of what the term ‘illegal alien’ tries to imply – i.e. they are the most law abiding residents and try to become virtually invisible in order to evade detection by the authorities.” Frank discussion about the advantages and disadvantages – economic, moral, or otherwise – associated with illegal migration should not be taboo.
Cheap Labor or Exploited Labor?
The debate over the use of illegal migrant labor is organized around several assumptions, the first being that undocumented migrants will agree to work for wages below the standard market rate. One can imagine why this would be true: wages that are considered intolerably low for a German worker might be very attractive to an undocumented migrant when compared to those he would receive in his country of origin, assuming work was even available there. The second assumption is that the employer will benefit from the use of illegal labor, leaving aside for the moment his disinclination to break the law. Obviously, he will save money on production if wages are lower, and in some cases he will be able to expand his workforce and increase his overall production. Additionally, he will not have to pay social security for his employees, which in Germany can amount to as much as half of total wages. On the down side, employers who do not use illegal labor may find themselves at a competitive disadvantage, the ironic downside of respecting the rule of law.
Some argue that the use of undocumented labor is a form of exploitation. Employers are essentially profiting from the precarious situation of undocumented migrants and their de facto lack of negotiating leverage by compelling them to accept wages that are “unfair” in the sense that they tend to be far below those a German worker would expect to receive. In making such a case, though, one would have to apply standards that the undocumented workers do not apply to themselves when entering into contracts with employers. Aside from instances of actual slavery, undocumented workers enter into contracts freely with their employers in the hope that they are getting a better deal than would be available at home. It is thus hard to argue from an ethical standpoint for the return of these workers to their home countries, even to prevent their “exploitation.”
Practically speaking, to complain about working conditions or sue for lost wages in Germany would mean almost sure detection and subsequent deportation.
On the other hand, it would be rather difficult to say that because undocumented migrants choose to leave their countries and join the illegal workforce, both they themselves and the receiving country should be satisfied with their abject lack of legal and social rights. In theory, any worker has the right to complain about working conditions or sue for lost wages. But practically speaking, to do so in Germany would mean almost sure detection and subsequent deportation, as courts routinely check on the immigration status of the plaintiff. Some employers take advantage of this situation by either not paying the agreed wage or withholding wages altogether. This lack of basic legal rights should be considered separately from the issue of wage exploitation, as it underlines the inadequacies of a “free contract” when one of the negotiating parties is in an undocumented status.
The Unemployment Question
In a time of high unemployment such as the present, there is a tendency to recast the problem of undocumented migration as one of “illegals” taking jobs away from German citizens. However, this claim fails to take into account the complexity of the unemployment problem in Germany, one that exists in the context of a very inflexible labor market and a generous social welfare program that can act as a substitute for workforce participation. The extent to which undocumented workers cause unemployment is linked to their effect on the equilibrium wage – by increasing the labor supply, they provoke a downward shift in the market wage, leading to an increase in official unemployment, even though total employment – legal and illegal – increases in absolute terms.
The impact of this phenomenon, however, is limited to the unskilled, low-wage sector of the economy, which is very small in Germany as in most advanced industrialized economies. Moreover, German nationals employed in this sector are already facing competition from abroad as labor-intensive production is being shifted to developing countries. Yet in many cases, German unemployment has more to do with employees’ lack of mobility between economic sectors or geographic regions. Studies conducted in the United States indicate that illegal migrants, even more so than their legal counterparts, actually fulfill endogenous labor shortages in certain sectors. The doubtful relationship between illegal immigration and unemployment is also described by Thomas Strobl, Christian Democratic Union member of the Bundestag: “We are dealing here with often poorly-paid jobs for which, in part, Germans would be hard to find. Therefore, the correlation between illegal immigration and high unemployment in Germany does not have to be exaggerated.”
The increase in human trafficking over recent years is indicative of a certain naïveté among illegal migrants, such that they will pay enormous sums to smuggle themselves into the EU, enduring the most appalling conditions imaginable along the way.
Other Humanitarian Considerations
If we acknowledge the positive economic contributions undocumented migrants make, the precariousness of their position appears all the more problematic. Living conditions are often deplorable, with as many as ten immigrants crammed into a two-bedroom apartment. Undocumented migrants live under constant threat of being discovered and deported. This fear opens them up to all kinds of abuse – financial, physical, and even sexual – without any possibility of legal recourse. Neither are these people well informed about the difficulty of the situation they will be confronting in the country of destination, nor can they possibly anticipate the challenges they might face along the way. The increase in human trafficking over recent years is indicative of a certain naïveté among illegal migrants, such that they will pay enormous sums to smuggle themselves into the EU, enduring the most appalling conditions imaginable along the way. Although it may be their illegal status that gives these migrants their particular economic value, one cannot accept ethically the subhuman means by which they are compelled to enter.
Current Policy Initiatives
Short of dissolving national borders completely, the question will remain: How do we deal with those who enter or reside in the country illegally? Making a general distinction between pre- and post-entry measures, it appears that strengthening the needle sifter is more efficient than later hunting down a needle in the haystack. As Strobl observes, “Everything that can be done before people enter the country facilitates the control of immigration, whereas everything becomes more difficult once people are in the country.”
Stage 1: Visas
The national strategy for combating illegal immigration begins with controlling inflows – limiting the number of potential migrants who can enter the country through visa requirements and restrictions. People outside of the European Union are eligible to enter for a period of three months, but only citizens of perceived “sending countries” (or other countries considered “security threats”) are required to apply for and possess a visa upon entry. Eligibility requirements are meant to safeguard against overstays and may include possession of a return ticket and/or proof of a certain amount of money.
There is evidence that the visa application system has become corrupt at the embassy level in some countries.
The effectiveness of this policy is obviously limited. It is difficult to identify potential illegal migrants without unfairly discriminating against individuals with the legitimate intention of visiting or studying in Europe, especially since countries that are popular destinations for undocumented migrants also tend to be popular destinations for tourists and students. There is also evidence that the visa application system has become corrupt at the embassy level in some countries, such as the Ukraine, allowing many migrant workers to enter Germany on tourist visas. That is not to say that visa restrictions are not an important tool in combating illegal immigration; it continues to be the case that nationals of countries who, due to bilateral arrangements, are not required to hold visas upon entry (especially Poland) constitute a large percentage of the undocumented seasonal labor force in Germany.
Stage 2: Tightening the borders
Of course, withholding a visa does not mean that potential immigrants will cease efforts to get into the desired receiving country. Rather, they embark upon the much more uncertain strategy of illegal border crossing. Over the 1990s, the German Border Patrol increased personnel at Eastern borders more than threefold, militarizing the borders to Poland and the Czech Republic. Still, the German approach to border control has been relatively “low-tech”, relying on phoned-in denunciations from residents living in the border corridor for almost 70 percent of all apprehensions.
Coordination of border control efforts, moreover, is increasingly taking place at the European level, given that there is more or less unrestricted movement once within the territory of the EU. Approximately 140 million euros have been earmarked in this direction until 2006, including 45 million euros towards a new Border Management Agency to “coordinate monitoring of land, air and sea borders, especially in the Mediterranean, where boatloads of illegal immigrants are said to wash up on the shores of Italy and Spain on a near-daily basis.”
The U.S., which spends nearly $1 billion annually on border security, only apprehends approximately 30 percent of attempted illegal crossers.
Although little statistical evidence on the rate of border apprehension exists for Europe, the U.S., which spends nearly $1 billion annually on border security, only apprehends approximately 30 percent of attempted illegal crossers. But the importance of border control is also in its deterrent effect: “Even though border control policies are often merely symbolic, they are wanted by the public and do affect some migrants whose passage becomes more dangerous with every step taken to militarize the borders.” In light of increasing fear of terrorism, citizens want to see that the government is doing something to keep dangerous individuals out of their country.
Stage 3: Combating human trafficking
Despite the different political backgrounds and the conflicting interests at stake, there is a general consensus about the need to combat organized crime. Already, a multibillion-dollar industry has developed around clandestine travel agencies. Moreover, there is evidence that there is a fair amount of corruption among border patrols and that immigration officers can be bought.
Much like the drug industry (and in fact human traffickers and smugglers of other valuable goods are already collaborating) worldwide criminal networks can only be effectively eliminated with international cooperation. Individual countries will have to share intelligence, information, judicial tasks, and financial responsibilities. The establishment of Europol and Eurojust indicates that this necessity is taken seriously by EU member states. However, they have yet to prove their efficacy.
One might describe the approach to dealing with illegal immigrants post-entry as one of “carrots and sticks.” However, the only carrot widely advocated is a program of “voluntary” return subsidies, intended to encourage illegal immigrants to reveal themselves to the authorities by offering them in exchange a free return flight in addition to a certain amount of financial assistance to facilitate their reintegration. While this policy has proven to be very effective with civil war refugees returning home following an armistice, it is unlikely to be attractive to illegals who have come to Germany to escape economic hardship in their home countries. In practice, the only beneficiaries of such a policy are migrants already contemplating voluntary return. It does little to reduce the number of illegal immigrants already in the country, while potentially inviting abuse.
Out of 80,000 checks conducted in Germany between August and December 1998, only 500 led to immigration-related apprehensions.
The “sticks,” or more aggressive and punitive measures, can together be summarized as the “3 Ds”: detection, detention, and deportation. It is obvious that permanent illegal residence or work in a country undermines both national and European immigration and asylum policy and challenges the rule of law. However, given the considerable economic advantages of illegal immigration to an overregulated and inflexible labor market such as Germany’s, the practice of enforcement is somewhat different. In fact, the Süssmuth Commission finds the lack of tough 3D enforcement to be a major reason for certain groups of asylum seekers without legitimate claim and other illegal immigrants to choose Germany as their country of destination.
Regarding detection, arbitrary identity checks by the German border patrol have proven to be extremely inefficient. Out of 80,000 checks conducted in Germany between August and December 1998, only 500 led to immigration-related apprehensions. Moreover, they led to numerous instances of discrimination, since officers were only instructed to verify the identity of individuals appearing “suspicious” or “un-German.” Visa over-stayers can be identified relatively easily through cooperation with carriers and airports by obliging them to share their information on unused return tickets. At the same time, shifting the burden of detection to other state agencies, especially schools and hospitals, is unacceptable, as is the prosecution of individuals and/or charities who offer humanitarian assistance to illegal migrants.
Detection is not the only problem; enforcing deportation orders has also proven to be particularly challenging. Many illegal residents have destroyed their passports and ID cards, and even if their identity can be established, their countries of origin are not always willing to allow their readmission or repatriation. This is in addition to the numerous other legal obstacles to deportation, such as the threat of torture or the unlikelihood of receiving a fair trial in the home country. The problem of repatriation has become severe enough that the EU, with Germany’s full support, is considering imposing severe sanctions on countries that are uncooperative with respect to the readmission of their citizens.
Nevertheless, if in the end the only thing illegal immigrants have to fear is being sent back to where they came from, the increased probability of deportation is not going to serve as a significant deterrent during the initial decision-making process. As important as the rule of law is, restrictive measures are only reasonable insofar as they can have an effect. And the effectiveness of the 3Ds in Germany is, relative to the resources currently expended in this direction, not very great.
To regularize or not to regularize
Given Germany’s constitutional obligation to provide social security to all legal residents, much of their contribution to GDP will be swallowed up in the form of social benefits.
Given the enormous difficulties of detecting and deporting illegal migrants, the simplest though most controversial means of addressing the current illegal population is to offer them the opportunity to “regularize” (legalize) their status. Numerous European countries have introduced regularization programs since the 1980s, including France, Belgium, Italy and Spain. Usually the migrant must meet certain criteria in order to be eligible, such as entry before a certain date and proof of self-sufficiency or an offer of employment. The host country will then grant authorization, either on a temporary or permanent basis. Although the argument is often made that regularization programs encourage future illegal immigration, there is little evidence to support this claim: If potential migrants chose their destination country based on the likelihood of a future amnesty, there would be far fewer illegal residents in Germany!
Although regularization does not appear to have an impact on future illegal migration, it does solve the immediate problem of their illegal status. Most workers will choose to participate in regularization programs, given that wages generally rise and social benefits may become available. But it is important to recognize that some of the economic advantages offered by undocumented migrant workers will be lost once they have achieved legal status. Given Germany’s constitutional obligation to provide social security to all legal residents, much of their contribution to GDP will be swallowed up in the form of social benefits. Also, they will cease to provide a source of cheap labor as a significant portion of their wages will be deducted in the form of taxes and social security benefits. In the case that certain EU countries with economies structured differently than that of Germany should want to absorb these workers into the formal sector, it is unlikely that this will be tolerated in the future by other member states.
Employer Sanctions: Targeting Labor Market Demand
While many aspects of illegal immigration policy target the supply of undocumented migrant labor, it is also possible to target the demand. Implementing sanctions against employers of undocumented migrants, as well as nationals working illegally, adds a risk premium to their wage, thus reducing the financial advantages of hiring this type of worker and also damaging the firm’s public image. As demand for illegal labor decreases, so do job availability and wages in the informal sector, two of the largest pull factors for potential migrants. Although targeting employers is not much talked about in the German context, a report by the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography for the Council of Europe stated quite boldly “it is not possible to curb the phenomenon of clandestine migration unless appropriate sanctions are foreseen and implemented against those who employ clandestine migrants.” (Section 2.34) These measures have the additional benefit of eliminating the unfair competitive advantage that results from the employment of undocumented labor.
In Germany, there does not seem to be much political initiative to clamp down on the informal sector, although fines have been on the rise in recent years.
Where these sanctions have been implemented in Europe and the United States, though, they have proved to be of limited effectiveness. From an economic perspective, it is clear that sanctions can only work if the risk premium associated with hiring unauthorized workers exceeds the amount saved by employing them rather than legal workers. Fines that amount to little more than a slap on the wrist, as in the current case, cannot hope to act as a deterrent. Christian Klos, an official in the Justice and Home Affairs department of the European Commission, admits as much: “Companies do think in economic terms, and it is more attractive from a calculation point-of-view to take a little fine of several hundred euros [than to stop employing illegal labor]”. Furthermore, the political feasibility of the implementation of sanctions has much to do with society’s general attitude towards combating clandestine employment of nationals and migrants alike, especially since the government organ responsible for conducting controls and raids at the workplace is the Labor Office. In Germany, there does not seem to be much political initiative to clamp down on the informal sector, although fines have been on the rise in recent years and can range anywhere from 4,000 € to as much as 200,000 €. A last obstacle to the effective implementation of employer sanctions has to do with the technical and legal difficulties of compelling employers to check up on the work authorization of their employees, given the numerous forms of identification that can be used. This does not seem to be as much of a problem in Germany where the labor market is so carefully regulated. However, one runs the risk that employers will discriminate against authorized foreign workers to avoid bureaucratic hassle.
From Analysis to Policy Making: Where to Go?
In considering the enforcement measures that are taken against illegal immigration, it has become clear that the borders and the 3D policies of destination countries, such as Germany, can barely act as more than a semi-permeable membrane for global migration flows. They are simply not strong enough to resist the diffusion of desperate persons whose desire to migrate is often caused by enormous disparities in economic conditions, political stability, and environmental catastrophe. People will always find the means, even if illegal and dangerous, to enter their perceived promised land. Any realistic policy of prevention will have to take that into account. In the end, this analysis of illegal immigration’s role in Germany today suggests that a two-part policy strategy is necessary.
First, it is beneficial to offer the possibility of legal status to low-skilled immigrants whose goal is to reside and work in Germany but who do not necessarily meet the requirements laid out in the new immigration law still awaiting ratification. Strobl of the CDU maintains that the policy currently under debate goes far enough, but it is crucial to go beyond it. The most feasible way of doing this is to offer low-skilled immigrants a form of renewable temporary residence and work permit rather than permanent residence. Hans-Christian Strobele, a member of the Bundestag and vice chairman of the parliamentary faction Alliance 90/The Greens, remarks that this kind of further liberalization was his party’s goal for the recent Immigration Law: “Due to harsh resistance from the conservative opposition we have not opened the German labor market for qualified labor migrants from third countries, nor have we implemented instruments for the so-called demographic immigration. We just liberalized access for highly qualified personnel, for entrepreneurs, and for students who want to work in Germany after they have taken their final exams. Usually, labor migrants will get temporary work permits. This can be changed into a permanent status after the migrant has worked here for five years – and when she or he has attended one of the new integration courses successfully.”
Gaining temporary status – for, say, twenty-four months, with the possibility of renewal – would not immediately make one eligible to receive permanent status, with its many privileges, after a time.
Klos, of the EU Commission Office for Justice and Home Affairs, states that the Commission is generally in favor of seeing EU member states create legal channels for labor migration wherever shortages of workers exist, especially in the service sector. Yet he acknowledges that the Commission does not see itself issuing an EU-wide directive specifying what legal channels should be created: “Ultimately, it is left up to the member states to decide where the demand for workers exists. The Commission only asks that states have clear procedures and transparency in the process of applying for legal status.” It seems, then, that Germany must use its prerogative to offer the opportunity for current illegal immigrants of working age, along with prospective future immigrants who might seek work in Germany, to apply for temporary residence and work permits, regardless of whether they are skilled or unskilled. In this way, such immigrants will – regardless of income level – both contribute fiscally to a welfare state that is facing increasing pressure due to Germany’s aging population and draw benefits that are more proportional to their inputs.
Importantly, such a strategy would not constitute the radical and ultimately unsustainable move of granting asylum on grounds of economic hardship, because persons applying for this legal status would not immediately receive state benefits without contributing anything in return. Rather, they would have to demonstrate that a job offer is already available in order to qualify for this status. At the same time, gaining temporary status – for, say, twenty-four months, with the possibility of renewal – would not immediately make one eligible to receive permanent status, with its many privileges, after a time. Instead, one must demonstrate a certain degree of financial solvency and knowledge of the German language somehow comparable to the level required for obtaining German citizenship. In the end, this strategy could yield a two-tier welfare state, similar to the one that is developing in Denmark, with the possibility of mobility between the two tiers. Moreover, it would serve to recognize the contributions of labor migrants to Germany while also helping to reduce the pressure currently placed on the German asylum system: Many of the applicants who currently apply for asylum out of economic hardship rather than “fear of persecution” would not have to pursue the asylum route (only to have their applications rejected) but could instead gain temporary legal status.
Additionally, however, Germany must back up its rhetorical commitment to the rule of law by acting more consistently on 3D enforcement. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind the factor limiting the liberal state’s capacity to deter immigration via coercive measures. Democratic societies and free market economies are built on individual freedom and the right to privacy and, consequently, there will always be a certain element of illegality that remains invisible and goes unpunished. If our ultimate goal is to prevent immigration outside of either the proposed legal channels or the asylum system, enforcing sanctions against employers who continue to use illegal labor can be successfully combined with 3D enforcement in a fair application of the rule of law. In sum, it is both morally unacceptable and economically undesirable to maintain a system that is loose enough to allow a sizable sector of illegal labor to flourish, without being loose enough to give such laborers any of the protections guaranteed to legal workers.
Anderson, Philip. Lecturer, Catholic University of Applied Sciences, Munich. Conducted via telephone, June 25, 2004.
Bommarius, Christian. Leitender Redakteur Innenpolitik, Berliner Zeitung. June 28, 2004.
Hagedorn, Heike. Bundesministerium Innen … . Conducted via telephone, June 24/25 (?), 2004.
Klos, Christian. Office for Justice and Home Affairs of the European Commission. Conducted via telephone, June 29, 2004.
Özcan, Veysel. Researcher, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin. Conducted via e-mail, July 1, 2004.
Raiser, Ulrich. Researcher, Berlin Office of Foreigners’ Affairs. June 28, 2004.
Strobl, Thomas. Member, Bundestag (Christian Democratic Union). Conducted via e-mail, June 30, 2004.
Ströbele, Hans-Christian. Member, Bundestag (Alliance 90/The Greens). Conducted via e-mail, June 30, 2004.
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